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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
TROY MILLER and JOHN U. WEBBER,) 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, ) 
Vi • ) 
ALBERT PACKER and WENDELL ) No, 965l 
'THOMPSON, ) 
Defendants and Appellants. ) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
--·---
RELIEF SOUGHT ON AP~EAL 
Respondents seek to answer appellants brief 
on appeal and an order of this Court for denial of 
such appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents, as real estate salesman and 
broker brought together the appellants and Mr. and 
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Mrs. John Wallen in order that the appellants might 
build a home for Mr. and Mrs. John Wallen. Which 
home was to be constructed upon a lot and built accor-
ding to the plans and specifications as approved by 
Mr. and Mrs. Wallen and the appellants, all for a 
price certain. The appellants were to construct the 
prefabricated home and the costs for such work, for 
the lot, and for all other expenses were to be included-
in the price certain, which price had been agreed upon 
prior to any work being done by the appellants. The 
appellants then commenced work to construct said 
home and progress payments were made to appellants 
by Mr. and Mrs. John Wallen, which money was dis-
bursed directly to appellants by the First Security 
Bank of Brigham City, Utah. 
Upon completion of the home Mr. and Mrs. John 
Wallen arranged for long -term financing at Home Bene-
fit Savings artd Loan, Salt Lake City, Utah and such 
loan was closed by said Home Benefit Savings and Loan 
in Salt Lake City. That all papers, costs and disburse-
ments were made by such lending institution, and such 
papers were approved and signed by both interested 
parties, i.e. appellants and Wallens. Respondent 
Webber attended such clos1ng upon request of the lend-
ing institution and at the request of no one else and 
was not acting in any capacity toward the appellants, 
as either a broker or an agent to advise the appellants 
as to their rights. Appellants were experienced in 
building and had closed many loans personally at fi-
nancial institutions. 
Prior to closing in Salt Lake City the First 
Security Bank in Brigham City, Utah had paid out all 
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Money on the construction loan to either the appellants 
or to Briggs Manufacturing Company for purchase of 
the package home. The $500.00 check alleged to have 
been paid for freight was paid to the Briggs Manufac-
turing Company to complete payment of the package 
(R l5l, L l3 -Zl) and never forwarded to Thomas C. 
Dyer, Incorporated, who charged and collected for 
freight costs, which costs were to be in the total pur-
chase price between appellants and Wallens. 
Demand for $500. 00 as outlined in appellants 
statement of fact was made by Briggs Manufacturing 
Company for payment upon the package home and not 
made by Webber (~ l48, l49). 
The counter claim as filed by the appellants was 
filed in open court after plaintiff and respondent had 
completed their case and after defendants and respon-
dents had completed their Testimony but prior to 
cross examination of Defendant's last witness 
(R t24, L 26 and R l30, L 28-30). 
ARGUMENT 
WANT OF JURISDICTION 
Upon the face of the record on appeal as filed by 
the appellants this court is without jurisdiction to hear 
this matter pursuant to Rule 73 (a) URCP. 
Appellants filed a motion to amend the judgment 
of the district court on the 20th day of December, l96l, 
which judgment was entered on the lst day of December, 
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1961. Pursuant to Rule 73 (a) URCP the time for filing 
an appeal from such final judgment is tolled by the 
timely filing of a Motion to Amend Judgment under Rule 
52 (b) URCP. However, said Motion to Amend and there. 
by toll the running of the time limit for appeal as pre-
scribed in Rule 73 (a) URCP must be within 10 days 
after entry of Judgment (Rule 52 (b) URCP). It appearing 
on the face of the record that such timely filing was not 
within the time limit of one month for appeal of such 'at\~ 
judgment is not tolled and appellants' appeal cannot be 
heard by this court for lack of this court to entertain 
the requisit jurisdiction of such an appeal~ (Allen v 
Garner 45 U 39, 143 Pac 228; Sorenson v Korsgaard 
83 U 177, 27 Pac 439). 
The District Court by granting hearing after time 
for motion to amend had expired did not thereby revive 
the appeal time or toll the running of the time limitation 
for appeal, inasmuch as the District Court had thereby 
lost its jurisdiction to hear such a motion to amend. 
And further, that even if this court should deter-
mine that such a motion to amend was timely made and 
the time for appeal was thereby tolled the District 
Court heard such motion to amend on the 14th day of 
February, 1962 at ll:OO A.M. (R 227, L ll-18) and the 
Court after hearing of said Motion to Amend took under 
advisement such motion, and such motion was denied 
on the 19th day of February, 1962, and appellants' no-
tice of appeal wasP~C1e~~PY 21, 1962, not within the one 
month required by Rule 73 _(a) URCP. Notice of over-
ruling of motion to start running the limitation--on time 
for appeal: (Jones v Evans 38 U 291, U6 Pac 333; J3lyth 
&: Fargo Co. v Swenson 15 U 345, 49 Pac 1027; Hender-
son v Barnes 27 U 348, 75 Pac 759). 
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POINT I 
COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS MO-
TION TO SEPARATE THE CAUSES OF THE TWO RE-
SPONDENTS FOR TRIAL. 
Appellants brief alleges improper joinder of action 
under Rule 20 (8) URCP, however, said action which was 
filed (L) arose out of the same transaction or occurance, 
which transaction was that the agreed upon price was to 
cover all costs of building a prefabricated home and for 
the ground upon which to Locate such a home (Gerard v 
Mercer, D. C. Mont. L945 62 F. Supp. 28). (2) That in 
any series of transactions common to one purpose, to-
wit construction of a home over a period of time, that to 
separate each transaction would be multiplicitous and re-
quire substantially the same proof at each hearing to es-
tablish a foundation for an action at Law and when such 
duplication is made to appear it is the intent of the rules 
of Civil Procedure to do away with such duplication. 
(Farni v Tesson L Black (US) 309). 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANTS BY THEIR OWN TESTIMONY 
CLAIM NOT TO HAVE BEEN PARTNERS IN ANY VEN-
TURE TO ERECT THE HOME IN QUESTION, BUT AP-
PELLANTS ALLEGE AS A DEFENSE IN THEIR BRIEF 
THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE PARTNERS BECAUSE 
THEY WERE TO SHARE IN THE PROFITS. 
The record (R L8L, L 9-2 L) indicates at no time that 
the respondents were to share in the profits of the appel-
Lants. A real estate commission was to be paid not from 
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profits but upon the appellants making a profit. Respon-
dents were not to share pre-se in a percentage of any 
profit. 
Even assuming that the respondents were to share in 
the profit sucq. sharing is only prima facia evidence of a 
partnership and that if such sharing is for the payment 
of a debt or otherwise then no such inference can be 
~~~ (emphasis added) that the respondents were in any 
particular partners and thereby limited to recovery of 
profits only or to sue for an accounting as the only means 
to obtain relief (48-l-4 (4) (a)). 
POINT III 
THE COURT DETERMINED AS A MATTER OF 
FACT THAT MR. JOHN WALLEN PURCHASED A 
HOME UPON A LOT AND THAT THE PURCHASE 
PRICE INCLUDED THE HOME AS WELL AS THE 
GROUND UPON WHICH IT WAS LOCATED, (FINDING 
OF FACTS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW PARA.l) AND 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENTS, TROY 
MILLER, ADVANCED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE 
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS THE SUM OF 
$l,460.00 OF WHICH ONLY $l, 000.00 HAD BEEN RE-
PAID AND THAT THERE REMAINED AN UNPAID BAL-
ANCE OF $460. 00. 
The Court as the trier of fact being in the bet~er po-
sition to determine such matters as contested facts is 
given great latitude in determining such facts and such 
determination as made by the trial court shall be upheld 
unless such court is in clear and obvious error (53 Am. 
Jur. Trial ll44). 
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However, the court had sufficient information and 
testimony upon which such a determination could be 
made (R l99, L l0-l6). 
The appellants allege that plaintiff and respondent 
could not recover for unpaid portion of the purchase price 
because of an oral contract to purchase real property 
under (25-5-3, UCS, l953), however, such statute or 
frauds only requires that to have any sale taken out of 
the statute that the party to be charged sign a memoran-
dum or other document stating with sufficient clarity 
the identification and description of the subject matter 
(25-5-3, UCA, l953, 49 Am Jur. 354) .. 
The appellants cannot be allowed to sign a contract 
to construct a home upon a lot knowing that the full pur-
chase price of the home agreed upon in such contract 
is to include all costs including ground costs (R l37, 
L 5-22) and then be allowed to set up the defense of the 
statute of Frauds and be allowed to receive an unjust 
gain from such defense. 
With complete memorandum thus taking this matter 
out of the statute of Frauds, any claim for non-payment 
of a valid cost, the appeLlant cannot set up a further 
defense that the respondents were mere volunteers and 
advanced money as a jesture of cooperation knowing 
that the lot was to be included in the sale prior to the 
time the earnest money in question was executed (R 94, 
L l7 -l9) and that any money paid down was considered 
to be earnest money on the entire contract and to be ap-
plied against the entire contract (R l58, L l3) .. 
Further there is no find:tng of any breach of a fidu-
ciary duty or grounds for estoppel on the part of Miller 
and this matter being raised the first time an appeal 
cannot be considered by the Court. 
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POINT IV 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WEBBEF 
AND MILLER FOR REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Respondents acting as real estate men brought to-
gether a willing seller and a capable buyer in orde,r that 
the seller Thompson and Packer might sell to the Wallen1 
a home. Such buyers and sellers entered into a binding 
contract between themselves; such contract provided for 
the payment of a real estate commission by the seller 
(Ptf Exhibit #Q to the agent who brought such buyer and 
seller together (Plf Exhibit #l, Line 4l, 42). 
The parties to such contract agreed to the terms 
contained in such contract and by the terms of such an 
agreement bestowed upon respondents the right to re-
ceive a real estate commis s1on; and that the appellants 
are now estopped to deny responsibility for such commis· 
sion, when the contract having been fully performed by 
both parties to such a contract, with the intent that the 
respondents should specifically be benefited (Beveridge 
v New York Elev R. Co. l9 N. E. 489; Second National 
Bank v Grand Lodge F. A.M. 98 U.S. l23 ). In Calder 
v Richarson D.C. ll F. Supp 948 it was held "that a 
third person may enforce a contract made for his bene-
fit even though the benefit of the parties was the main 
purpose of the contract. " 
POINT V 
Appellants filed counter claim at the admitted con-
clusion of their direct testimony (R l24, L 26) asking for 
special or punative damages for under payment by Home 
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Benefit Savings and Loan of Salt Lake City on December 
16, 1958. 
The court in its finding that appellants were not un-
der paid had an opportunity to hear all testimony con-
cerned on such matter which testimony included_ the ap-
pellants who admitted 
l. That they were builders of some experience who 
had closed at least thirty loans within the last ten years 
(R 170, L 4-8) 
2. That Mr. John Wallen established a construction 
loan with the First Security Bank in Brigham City, Utah 
for construction of the home and that appellants were 
drawing all their money from Mr. Wallen (R 166, L l-2) 
3. That at the time of closing the final loan at 
Home Benefit Savings and Loan in Salt Lake City that 
appellants had relied upon the figures given to them by 
the First Security Bank of Brigham City, to-wit: 
(Page 166 of Record: Commencing line 8) 
A. Therefore when we arrived at the Home Benefit 
we took the figures that was presented that that 
what was drawn. So the First Security Bank gave 
them to us and they were taking care of the draws 
and handing them to us. 
Q. The First Security Bank gave you the figures for 
the closing? 
A. Yes, but we weren't aware that they had previously 
,_-'-,awn $1,500. 00. We took Mr. Nelson's word, who 
said that this $500. 00 when we closed that day, this 
takes care of all the draft of $12, 000. 00 and we fi-
gured that we had used it. 
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Q. This conversation with Mr. Nelson, was that in the 
bank? 
A. Surely. 
and further the appellants had information from Mr·. 
Leo Nelson of the First Security Bank of Brigham City 
that "he (Mr. Nelson) had the $12, 000.00 account, and 
he stated many times before we closed out there was 
only $500.00 due, which would take care of the account 
that was left with Briggs, and he wouldn't allow Wallens 
to draw on it, or us, until we had settled with Briggs." 
(R 169, L 25 -59) 
The appellants further allege that they relied upon 
respondent Mr. Webber to protect their i-nterest but 
that they went to Home Benefit Savings and Loan with-
out Mr. Webber and that Home Benefit requested Mr. 
Webber's attendance. (R 137, L30; R 138, L l-8) 
Further the appellants had closed out many loans 
and under stood all costs concerned and that all charges 
charged against the appellants were charged at their 
own approval and with their knowledge. (R 138, L 27-
30; R l39 Ll-3; R 34, L 22-30; R 35, L 1,2) 
The appellants admit that $12,173.81 was paid to the 
First Security Bank of Brigham City (R l39 L 29-30; 
R 140, L l-2) and that the Bank in Brigham _City prior 
to the closing informed them that $12, 000.00 was drawn 
there and supplied them the information as to such pay-
ment (supra). 
Plaintiff Exhibit #7 clearly indicates that the Plain-
tiffs and respondents herein received nothing upon the 
closing of the loan at Home Benefit Savings and Loan 
and that there was apparently full disclosure of all facts. 
to 
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Appellants further appeared to have understood 
that the $875.00 or market dis count must be paid by 
someone other than the buyer under a V .A. regulation 
because they have closed out other loans as the seller 
and paid this expense (R l7l, L ll-l4} and that the 
Veterans Administration required appellants to assume 
such dis count costs before the V. A. would give any 
loan to the buyer Wallen (R l7l, L 26-27). 
Appellants further testified that they received 
additional money from the buyer Wallen which was not 
counted in their claim for loss (R l78, L 24-30). 
The court further found that respondent Webber 
breached a fiduciary duty in not informing the appel-
lants that he received a payment for sale of the prefa-
bricated package to appellants, and that the appellants 
purchased said package but that this was the only 
breach of any duty (Findings of Fact paragraph 4), and 
that there was no breach of any duty at the time of clo-
sing and that Mr. Webber was not grossly negligent 
nor did he engage in any willful misconduct toward 
defendants at the time of closing (Findings of Fact 
paragraph 5 }, and that where the court does not find 
such gross negligence or willful misconduct there can 
be no punative damage (67 ALR 2 952) nor is such a 
finding tanamount to a finding of negligence. Such find-
ing must specifically found and proved.. And further 
the appellants on appeal cannot allege simple negligence 
when such was not pleaded inthe triat court (Huber v 
Deep Creek Irrigation Co .. 305 Pac 2d 478 6 Utah 2d l5). 
Appellants allege that the respondents had a duty to 
protect the respondents during the closing of the trans~ 
action (Appellants Brief, P. 2l) and that respondents 
ll 
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had information available to them of such a character 
as to advise appellants of mbney spe~t or to be spent 
(Appellants Brief P. 2l) when by appellants own testi-
mony they had their own books, figures and informa-
tion at such closing (R l78, L l0-l8) which information 
was not in the hands of the respondents. 
There is no showing that the appellants relied upon 
the respondents to close this transaction, but that the 
matter was being handled by the Home Benefit Savings 
and Loan and that the appellants were not persons un-
familiar with closing costs, and further that appellants 
were not inept or lacking in business acumen with re-
spect to business affairs as found in the case of Reese 
v Harper (329 Pac 2d 4l0, 4l2). 
A broker and a real estate salesman are bound to 
use and to exercise reasonable care and skill, the same 
as is ordinarily possessed and used by others or per-
sons employed in similar undertakings, that is the bro-
ker or salesman will exercise his good faith and loyalty 
and use such skills as are necessary to accomplish the 
object of his employment (8 Am. Jur. Broker, Sec. 85), 
which employment objective was testified to by Mr-. 
Thompson and Mr. Packer to be that a buyer was to be 
provided them for the purchase of the package horne to 
be completed by them. 
A broker's duty is that of a negotiator and it is not 
incumbent for him to direct or to advise as to terms of 
a contract or to explain or construe words or terms 
used in a contract of sale. (8 Am. Jur. Brokers, Sec. 
85). 
In the capacity of a broker such broker has no au-
thority to close or to sign any contract in the name of 
l2 
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the seller of any property unless specifically authorized 
to do so clearly and definitely by the terms of the agree-
ment between the broker and seller .. (8 Am. Jur. Broker, 
Sec • 6l; l 7 L • R. A. (N • S • } (2l 0} • 
It is not incumbent upon a broker to act as legal coun-
cil for sellers or buyers of property or to discover pos-
sible mistakes or errors in closing papers when there is 
no actual authority or apparent authority vested in such 
broker to close such transaction for the seller. (North-
west Poultry & Dairy Products Co. v A. C. Furry Co. 
427 Wash. 2d, 35, l76 Pac. 2d 324). Particularly there 
is no duty on a broker to act as legal council to direct 
or advise when the sellers have an equal opportunity with 
the broker to protect their own interests, in that all in-
formation which is at hand and is open equally to all par-
ties, which in this case was the simple fact. (Slaughter 
v Gerson 80 U. S. 379, 383} In such cases the doctrine 
of Caveat Emptor applies with full force and effect, where 
no concealment is attempted and the means of obtaining 
information is open to both parties to such transaction. 
The seller or buyer must look to the title papers under 
which he takes and is charged with all facts that appear 
on their face or to knowledge or which anything there ap-
pearing would conduct him. He has no right to shut his 
eyes or ears to the inlet of information and then say he 
has no notice or knowledge.. Constructive notice is the 
same in effect as actual notice. (Coal Co~ v Doren l42 
U.S. 4l7; Northern Pacific R .. R. Co Zl Wash. 320, 55 
Pac. ZlO} There is no testimony that Mr. Thompson 
and/or Mr. Packer in any way relied upon Mr. Webber 
at the time of closing or the accepting of any money then 
due to them. 
13 
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Appellants further indicated that they did not look 
to respondents to satisfy any alleged loss, if such a 
loss was sustained, because by their action of filing a 
new suit in the Third District Court of Salt Lake COunty 
against Mr. John Wallen for the recovery of the same 
claim as alleged herein they admit that if any money is 
owed to the appellants it is owed by John Wallen and not 
by respondents (R 23l, L 28-30; R 232, L l-24). 
CONCLUSION 
The court is entitled to consider all the evidence 
and draw therefrom all reasonable and proper infer-
ences, even though another inference equally reason-
able might also be drawn (Main Realty Co. v Blackstone 
Valley Gas and Elec. Co. 59 RI 29, l93 A. 879, and 
ll2 ALR 744). Testimony uncontradicted by direct evi-
dence does not compel the finding in accordance there-
with, (Roberts v Roberts, l68 Cal 307, l42 Pac l080, 
and 31 ALR 707) since its credibility may be impeached 
by the interest of the witness and the improbability of 
his evidence. (53 Am. Ju:r. 7 98) Wherefore the 
judgment as rendered by the trial court should be af-
firmed and the appeal of the appellants be dismissed 
both upon the facts and law as presented and upon the 
further fact that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear 
or determine this matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALE E. STRATFORD 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondents 
llOl First Security Bank Bldg 
Ogden, Utah 
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